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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History
and Current Problems
Fifty years ago this month, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave
his Atoms for Peace address to the UN General Assembly.
He proposed to share nuclear materials and information for peaceful
purposes with other countries through a new international agency.
That speech led to negotiations which, several years later, created
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA today has
the dual responsibility of helping countries that do not have nuclear
weapons to engage in peaceful nuclear programs while ensuring that
they do not make nuclear weapons. In the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA gained authority
for policing the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure
that those without nuclear weapons did not acquire them.
Today, the NPT is a worldwide treaty that bans all members except
the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States
from having nuclear weapons and commits those five states to eventually
eliminating their atomic arsenals. The treaty provides the norm
and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons around the world. The 187 states that subscribe
to the NPT include all significant states of concern with the exception
of India, Israel, Pakistan, andarguablyNorth Korea.[1]
According to Ambassador Robert T. Grey, a former U.S. arms control
negotiator, the NPT is in many ways an agreement as important
as the UN Charter itself.[2]
Yet, many believe that the NPT regime is battered and in need of
strengthening.[3]
The NPT has in fact suffered major blows. Since 1991, uranium enrichment,
plutonium separation, and other possibly weapons-related activities
that Iraq, North Korea, and Iran hid from IAEA inspectors have been
discovered. Iraqs weapons program was found after the 1991
Persian Gulf War thanks to UN Security Council orders demanding
more intrusive inspections than were then required by IAEA inspection
standards. North Koreas weapons program later became known
through intelligence, IAEA inspections, and North Koreas own
admissions. The IAEAs discovery of Irans failure to
disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment
to inspectors has recently led to a standoff with Tehran.
Historically, the IAEA has rarely demanded inspections beyond the
perimeter of reactors or related nuclear sites that had been declared
open for inspection by the countries where they were located. Further,
uranium enrichment and plutonium separation does not violate the
NPT if done for peaceful purposes under IAEA inspection. In fact,
a number of more developed countries (e.g., Japan) conduct such
activities. In the three countries where uranium enrichment or plutonium
separation was thought to have been conducted for weapons purposesIran,
Iraq, and North Koreathe activities had taken place largely
at locations not declared open for inspection to the IAEA.
Moreover, that North Korea and Iran both obtained enrichment technology
from Pakistan suggests dangers to the NPT regime from nonparties
that are not bound by the treatys prohibition against assisting
non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons. The back-to-back
nuclear tests by New Delhi and Islamabad in 1998 illustrate the
dangers that an arms race in South Asia can have and suggest the
temptation that such tests could encourage current non-nuclear-weapon
parties to withdraw from the treaty in order to follow suit.
At the same time, the United States has not complied with some of
its own NPT-created obligations. For example, in 1995 the United
States won the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties
to extend the NPT indefinitely by promising to negotiate a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty was duly negotiated and signed
by President Bill Clinton in 1996, but the Senate failed to ratify
it in 1999. The Bush administration now opposes the CTBT, and the
Senate is unlikely to consider it again, at least before the next
election. That reflects a broader tendency by this Bush administration
to downgrade treaties and regimes and to upgrade unilateral efforts,
such as the pre-emptive use of force against Iraq, to enforce compliance
with nonproliferation.
In addition, the Bush administration has undertaken efforts to create
new types of nuclear weapons that might well require new testing.[4]
Thus, while pushing other countries to reject the acquisition of
nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to be
relying ever more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense.
This double standard constitutes another threat to the NPT regime.
These points are all relevant to the status of the NPT today and
will be explained in more detail below or in other articles in this
issue.
Early Nonproliferation Efforts
Eisenhowers 1953 Atoms for Peace speech came after
the failure of earlier U.S. nonproliferation efforts. At the end
of World War II, when the United States had the only nuclear weapons
in the world, President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the U.S.
nuclear arsenal if other countries would agree not to acquire nuclear
weapons and would permit inspections to verify that agreement. The
Baruch Plan of the Truman administration would have
given an agency under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council
a monopoly over research on how to make nuclear explosives and the
power, free of veto and backed up by military force if necessary,
to conduct inspections in other countries to make sure they were
not making nuclear weapons. The United States, however, would not
surrender its weapons to the agency until inspectors were on duty
in the Soviet Union and in other countries with nuclear potential.
The Soviet Union rejected this approach; it was already seeking
its own nuclear weapons. Skeptical about the Baruch Plan being debated
at the United Nations, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946 Atomic
Energy Act with provisions designed to keep nuclear technology secret
from other countries.[5]
By contrast, Eisenhower proposed providing assistance to other countries
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of his proposal,
the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was amended to authorize nuclear assistance
to others, and the IAEA was created to provide both assistance and
inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, followed
by the Soviet Union, France, and others, began providing research
reactors that used weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium (though
usually in lesser amounts than needed for a weapon) to non-nuclear-weapon
states around the world. These transfers and the training that accompanied
the reactors helped scientists in many countries learn about nuclear
fission and its potential uses.
As these scientists moved up the nuclear learning curve, global
support increased for controlling the spread of the new technology
in order to prevent its use for weapons. Soon, debate about nonproliferation
in the UN General Assembly produced a 1961 consensus Irish resolution
saying that countries already having nuclear weapons would undertake
to refrain from relinquishing control of them to others and
would refrain from transmitting information for their manufacture
to States not possessing them. Countries without nuclear weapons
would agree not to receive or manufacture them. These ideas were
the basis for the NPT.[6]
The United States submitted a simple draft treaty based on this
resolution to the Soviet Union when a new 18-nation Disarmament
Conference opened in Geneva in 1962. The Soviet response was to
insist on a treaty that would prohibit the arrangements that the
United States then had with NATO allies such as West Germany for
deployment, in their countries, of U.S. nuclear weapons under the
control of U.S. soldiersweapons to be used to protect these
countries, if necessary, in the event of an attack on them by the
Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet proposal and U.S. plans
for a multilateral force of naval vessels with nuclear
weaponsvessels manned by sailors from participating NATO countries
and under NATO commandbecame major obstacles to agreement.
By then, the multilateral force plan was strongly supported only
by West Germany. However, for the United States to agree that an
NPT should prohibit U.S. allies not having nuclear weapons from
joining in control of U.S. nuclear weapons in peacetime required
meetings with President Lyndon Johnson at Camp David, further negotiations
with Soviet representatives, recommendations to the president from
an important committee of distinguished advisers, lengthy discussions
with West Germany and other allies, a congressional resolution urging
negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, and bureaucratic maneuvering
to gain Johnsons approval for proposed treaty language.
In the compromise, the United States gave up on the multilateral
force; the Soviets gave up on a prohibition against U.S. deployment
of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and other allied countries),
provided the weapons remained under sole control of U.S. personnel.
The non-nuclear-weapon states were asked to accept draft language
which prohibited them from having nuclear weapons and which called
for the IAEA to be permitted to carry out inspections to guarantee
that their nuclear programs were limited to peaceful uses. In addition,
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed
to provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in their
pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to conduct
future negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their
nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.
Negotiations then began for gaining acceptance of these provisions
by important non-nuclear-weapon governments and their parliaments
and for prescribing the inspections that would be conducted by the
IAEA pursuant to the NPT. India, which had participated actively
in the NPT negotiations as a country without nuclear weapons, refused
to join. It wanted to retain the option to produce its own nuclear
weapons as its then-adversary, China, already had. Pakistan, another
adversary of India, refused to join because India would not. Israel,
which the United States had tried to restrain from acquiring nuclear
weapons in separate negotiations during the 1960s, also refused
to join. China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations
but had acquired nuclear weapons before its negotiation was completed.
The NPT draft permitted them to join the treaty with the same rights
and duties as the other nuclear-weapon statesthe United Kingdom,
the Soviet Union, and the United States. They did so later.
States began signing the treaty in 1968, and it went into force
in 1970. However, the negotiations at the IAEA among parties and
potential parties on the scope of inspections for non-nuclear-weapon
parties continued for several years. Many countries, including West
European allies of the United States, did not ratify the treaty
until these negotiations were completed to their satisfaction.[7]
There were also further negotiations every five years at NPT review
conferences. These dealt with implementation of treaty provisions
such as those promising assistance to non-nuclear-weapon states
for peaceful uses and calling for reductions of nuclear weapons
and for nuclear disarmament. At an important conference in 1995,
the treaty was extended indefinitely from its initial 25-year term.[8]
The 1995 decision and the review conference of 2000 focused particular
attention on the NPT-related promises of the nuclear-weapon states
to cease the nuclear arms race including stopping nuclear
testing, negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons, and eventually
achieving nuclear disarmament.[9]
Current Problems
Even as the legal regime was expanded by these agreements, the NPT
came under strain elsewhere. One of the most significant blows was
Iraqs demonstrated ability to hide its nuclear-weapon-making
efforts from IAEA inspectors before the Gulf War. With inspection
authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that
warauthority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification
standards had given the IAEAinspectors found previously hidden
Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons and even
an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched research-reactor
uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet
Union.[10]
These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEAs
NPT inspection authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA
parties who negotiated the 1997 model for this protocol did not
agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept the
model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards.
It is now up to each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised
safeguards agreement pursuant to the model.[11]
As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards
agreements; only 37, or about 20 percent, had given final approval
to them through parliamentary or other ratification.[12]
Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement
its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may
be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation
obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States rejects
an important onethe CTBT prohibition on nuclear testingand
then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself.[13]
After the experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques
to deal with other problem states such as North Korea. Some evidence
was produced by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s using a new technique
called environmental monitoringtesting for small
traces of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or
vegetation in areas within or surrounding a nuclear site, or in
streams or rivers nearby. This is explicitly authorized in the 1997
Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors
that a country has declared open for inspection.[14]
Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites
encouraged the IAEA to press North Korea for broader inspections
in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused. A stalemate between North
Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations between
the United States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework
between the two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle
a reactor whose spent fuel rods had apparently been used by North
Korea to produce plutonium. Pyongyang was also asked to provide
information about its past activities. These steps were to be in
exchange for the construction of new, more proliferation-resistant
nuclear reactors from South Korea and Japan, as well as interim
supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States.[15]
However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities
at other sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003,
North Korea and the United States each concluded that the 1994 agreement
was not to their liking, and North Korea announced its withdrawal
from the NPT.[16]
Discovery of Irans failure to disclose experiments with plutonium
separation and uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered
concern since last year. Using environmental monitoring and other
techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that Iran permitted
them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items,
including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used
for enriching uranium in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uraniumnone
of which Iran had reported to the IAEA. In negotiations with the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to sign an additional
protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside
its uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though
the IAEA director-generals report shows that Iran had not
disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-enrichment efforts or
an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA
lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making
weaponsto the consternation of officials in the United States.
The IAEA Board of Governors then adopted, with U.S. support, a decision
to order continued inspections in Iran for clandestine activities.[17]
The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq,
North Korea, and Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not
to permit such efforts even if subject to IAEA inspection. The concern
is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it might
then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks
of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium to make weapons. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment
and plutonium-separation plants of non-nuclear-weapon states be
placed under multilateral ownership and control so that the co-owners
from the different countries could check on each other.[18]
However, Japan; some western European non-nuclear-weapon countries;
and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and a few others, as well as
all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have experimented with enrichment
or reprocessing facilities. Should these all now be subject to a
rule requiring multilateral ownership and oversight? Would limiting
the requirement to non-nuclear-weapon countries be regarded as adding
further insult to the NPTs existing discrimination in favor
of nuclear-weapon states? IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei
has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities
used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled
in the future, with each country involved being urged to check on
what its partner countries are doing to make sure that the enriched
uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons purposes.[19]
The Bush administration has pressed hard on Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea to restrain them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it has
done so sometimes in unilateral or domineering ways that seem inconsistent
with a multilateral regime like that of the NPT. The American-led,
counter-proliferation-justified, preventive-war invasion of Iraq
in 2003 that the United States waged without UN Security Council
authorization is a recent example. At the time, the invasion was
said to be necessary to prevent Iraq from again acquiring nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons or long-range missiles. It took
place even though Security Council-authorized inspections, consistent
with the NPT, were going on in Iraq to look for these weapons. It
resulted in UN inspectors being withdrawn from Iraq for their own
safety. U.S inspectors have subsequently found little evidence of
ongoing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons programs but the
decision reflected Bushs tendency to downgrade treaties and
international efforts in favor of more proactive proliferation efforts.[20]
Likewise, the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT in 1999. The Bush
administration has not asked the Senate to reconsider that vote
and instead has said that the United States will not become
a party to that treaty.[21]
At the same time, the administration seeks money from Congress for
new types of nuclear weaponsones that may well need testing
before the United States would rely on them. However, in 1995, when
the United States negotiated an agreement with all the non-nuclear-weapon
states to extend the NPT beyond 1995, it agreed to negotiate a CTBT
by 1996 as part of the price it had to pay to gain agreement to
renew the NPT.[22]
The CTBT was negotiated by 1996. Then, in the 2000 NPT review conference,
the Clinton administration agreed on the importance and urgency
of ratification of the CTBT without delay to achieve
the early entry into force of the treaty even though the Senate
then had no plans to vote again on the CTBT.[23]
Is the CTBT such an essential element of the nonproliferation regime
that U.S. failure to join it could provide persuasive justification
for withdrawal from the NPT for those who choose to do so?[24]
Other problems of this sort occurred with Article VI of the NPT,
agreed to in the original treaty negotiations in order to gain the
support for the treaty of non-nuclear-weapon states. In that provision,
the United States and the other recognized nuclear-weapon states
promised to negotiate nuclear-weapon reductions with the goal of
nuclear disarmament. Then, to gain the votes of these parties for
extension of the NPT in 1995, the United States agreed to pursue
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with
the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.[25]
At the 2000 NPT review conference, the Clinton administration made
similar commitments. It also promised to implement START II (negotiated
in the prior Bush administration) and to conclude START III
[more reductions] as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening
the [Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)]
Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.[26]
These promises were shredded when the present Bush administration
withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The withdrawal nullified START II
because the Russian Duma had conditioned its approval vote for START
II on a continuation of the ABM Treaty. The substitute for START
II negotiated with Russia by President George W. Bush, the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, required withdrawal of warheads
from many long-range missiles on each side to the end that, by 2012,
no more than 2,200 warheads would be deployed on either side.[27]
The treaty, however, does not require the warheads to be destroyed,
calls for no inspections, has a more permissive withdrawal clause
than in START II, and contains no stated plan for a subsequent treaty
such as START III that would require further reductions. Does this
satisfy the NPT commitment to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament?
ElBaradei has suggested that the United States may be employing
a double standard by not actually cutting its own arsenal of nuclear
weapons (as distinct from its missiles) while attempting to restrain
other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.[28]
To gain the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties to the
treatys extension in 1995, the United States also made promises
in connection with a UN Security Council resolution calling for
what are called negative security assurances, which for the United
States was a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
NPT parties unless they attack the United States while in alliance
with another nuclear-weapon state.[29]
Yet, in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 and its National Strategy
on Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002, the Bush administration
made clear that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons against a
non-nuclear-weapon NPT party that threatened the use of chemical
or biological weapons against the United States or its allies whether
or not this NPT party was allied with a nuclear-weapon state.[30]
Thus, the United States watered down another promise that was important
to gaining the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT states-parties
for renewal of the NPT in 1995. Whether all these problems will
produce further withdrawals from the NPT is, of course, unknown,
but they might be used as excuses for withdrawal by any who want
to do so.
What Has the NPT Accomplished?
The NPT nonproliferation norm, the long-term efforts of the United
States and others to gain acceptance of it, and the international
inspections the NPT produced deserve significant credit for the
fact that the world does not now have 30 or more countries with
nuclear weapons.
In 1963 the Department of Defense looked at the motivations of the
nuclear-capable countries at the time and estimated
for Kennedy that perhaps 10 more of them could have nuclear weapons
and suitable delivery vehicles in less than a decade if nothing
was done to prevent such a scenario from unfolding; they were the
remaining major industrialized Group of Seven allies of the United
States plus China, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Poland, and Sweden.[31]
Thus, based on the 1963 list, 14 or more countries could have had
nuclear weapons by the early 1970s.
The Defense Departments list did not include Switzerland,
Australia, South Korea, or Taiwan, which all had scientists who
were then considering or would soon consider how to build nuclear
weapons. It did not include South Africa, which later built several
nuclear weapons, then gave them up and, like the others, joined
the NPT. It did not include any republics of the Soviet Union. Three
republicsBelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukrainehad Soviet
weapons on their territory when the Soviet Union collapsed and gave
them up to join the NPT after negotiations with Russia and the United
States supplied them with financial incentives and promises not
to attack them with nuclear weapons. Without the NPT norm, these
countries would probably not have given their inherited weapons
up. The Pentagon list did not include Argentina and Brazil, which
later began nuclear weapons programs but then negotiated a bilateral
agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and joined the NPTturning
rivalry into cooperation in response to the norm of the NPT and
of a Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone agreement.[32]
North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq began later and were not on
the Pentagons 1963 list either.[33]
If there had been no NPT, if all these countries plus the ones on
the list acquired nuclear weapons, the total would have been at
least 28 by now. Some neighbors and rivals would then probably have
been motivated to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. What would
the total have become? More than 30 countries with nuclear weapons?
Today, we have nine counting North Korea but not Iran.
The single most important factor in producing this success has been
the nonproliferation norm established by the NPT and the incentives
for remaining non-nuclear that the NPT helped initiate. The next
most important factor has probably been leadership, cooperative
efforts, and financial assistance in some cases from the United
States working with many other NPT parties.[34]
Given the more difficult nonproliferation and security challenges
of today, it is vital that U.S. leadership be used to strengthen,
not to weaken or abandon, the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
NOTES
1. Some believe that North Koreas withdrawal was invalid and
count it still as a party to the treaty.
2. See Bipartisan Security Group, Status
of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Interim Report (Global Security
Institute, June 2003), preface.
3. See Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer
World, The Economist (October 18, 2003), pp. 47-48;
Ariel Levite, Never Say Never Again, International
Security (Winter 2002-2003), p. 59; T. Ogilvie-White and John
Simpson, The NPT and Its 2003 Prep Com Session: A Regime in
Need of Intensive Care, The Nonproliferation Review
(Spring 2003), p. 40; Stanley Foundation Conference, Global
Disarmament Regimes: A Future or a Failure? (2003), p. 2;
Nuclear Breakout, The New York Times (July 27,
2003), p. 12.
4. See Sidney Drell et al., A Strategic
Choice: New Bunker Busters vs. Nonproliferation, Arms Control
Today (March 2003), p. 3.
5. George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee:
Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford University
Press, 1992), pp. 59-72.
6. Leonard Weiss, Atoms for Peace,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November-December 2003),
pp. 34, 37, 41; Bunn, Arms Control by Committee, pp. 64-66. Arms
Control by Committee provides a more detailed account of the
history of the NPTs negotiation.
7. Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb,
Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington
Books, 1987), p. 305; Charles N. Van Doren, Some Perspectives
on Supplier Control, in The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation,
eds. Rodney Jones et al. (Lexington Books, 1985), p. 17.
8. Decision: Extension of the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1, 1995, NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3.
9. Ibid.; 2000 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Final Document, 2000 NPT/CONF.2000/28 (May 22, 2000).
See Bipartisan Security Group, Status of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, pp. 2, 11-16.
10. See Joseph Cirincione, John Wolfsthal,
and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons
of Mass Destruction (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2002), pp. 271, 273-275; George Bunn and Chaim Braun, Terrorism
Potential of Research Reactors Compared with Power Reactors,
American Behavioral Sciences (February 2003), pp. 714, 717-718.
11. See Strengthening the Effectiveness
and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, IAEA
GC(40)17 (August 23, 1996), Annex I. For a view that authority for
the requirements of the protocol could have been interpreted to
be obligatory rather than voluntary, see George Bunn, Inspection
for Clandestine Nuclear Activities: Does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Provide Legal Authority for the IAEAs Proposals for
Reform? Nuclear Law Bulletin (OECD Nuclear Agency,
June 1996), p. 9.
12. See ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World,
pp. 47-48.
13. See Mohamed ElBaradei, Nuclear Non-Proliferation:
Revising the Basics, The Assymmetry Remains, speech at the
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14,
2002; Mohamed ElBaradei, Curbing Nuclear Proliferation,
Arms Control Today (November 2003), p. 3.
14. See Bunn, Inspection for Clandestine
Nuclear Activities, pp. 11-12.
15. See Cirincione, Wolstahl and Rajkumar,
Deadly Arsenals, pp. 241-250; Michael May et al., Verifying
the Agreed Framework (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-142036,
2001), chap. 1.
16. See Nuclear Weapons on the Korean
Peninsula, Arms Control Today (May 2003), p. 3.
17. See Brenda Shaffer, Iran at the
Nuclear Threshold, Arms Control Today (November 2003),
p. 7. The text of the agreement of Iran with the foreign ministers
of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany appears at p. 25. For
a brief description of the confidential IAEA director-generals
report on Irans nuclear program to the IAEA Board of Governors,
see William J. Broad, Surprise Word on Nuclear Gains by North
Korea and Iran, The New York Times, November 12, 2003,
p. A3.
18. See Carleton Thorne, ed., A Guide to
Nuclear Export Controls (2001), p. 101 (Nuclear Suppliers
Group Guidelines [Part 1], para. 7); ElBaradei, Towards a
Safer World, pp. 47-48; ElBaradei, Curbing Nuclear Proliferation.
19. ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World.
20. Jason D. Ellis, The Best Defense:
Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security, The Washington
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 116-117. For the two
national strategy documents most pertinent to U.S. pre-emptive use
of force to achieve nonproliferation, see National Strategy of
the United States (September 17, 2002), sec. 5; White House,
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December
11, 2002), sec. V.
21. Sherwood McGinnis, remarks to the UN General
Assembly First Committee.
22. See Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, NPT/CONF.1995/32/Dec.2
(May 11, 1995), para. 4(a) (hereinafter Principles and Objectives).
23. The 2000 NPT Review Conference,
Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28, art. VI, para. 5 (hereinafter
2000 NPT Final Document).
24. In the voting on the UN General Assembly
First Committees 2003 resolution supporting the CTBT as important
to nonproliferation, the United States was the only country to oppose.
See The First Committee Monitor, October 27-31, 2003.
25. See Principles and Objectives,
para. 4(b).
26. See 2000 NPT Final Document,
art. VI, para. 15, practical step 7.
27. See Letter of Transmittal and Article-by-Article
Analysis of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions,
Arms Control Today (July/August 2002).
28. Stephan Pullinger, U.S. Policy:
WMD, Good and Bad, Disarmament Diplomacy (October-November
2003), p. 55.
29. George Bunn, The Legal Status of
U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,
The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 1.
30. See National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction; U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear
Posture Review, (Global Security Institute, December 2002).
31. See Bunn, Arms Control by Committee,
p. 68.
32. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition:
Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 1995), chaps. 1-5; Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling
the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (Twentieth Century
Fund, 1982), pp. 13-14, 17, 100, 110-111; Thomas Jonter, Sweden
and the Bomb: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1972
(Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, 2001), chaps. 4-5.
33. See David Albright and Kevin ONeill,
Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Institute for Science
and International Security), chap. 1; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chaps.
1, 5, and 6; Leonard Spector and Jacquiline R. Smith, North
Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare? Arms Control Today
(March 1991), pp. 8-13.
34. See Levite, Never Say Never Again,
pp. 75-85.
George Bunn, the first general counsel for the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, helped negotiate the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and later became U.S. ambassador to the
Geneva Disarmament Conference.
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