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Summing
up Disarmament and Conversion Events
Arms Control in Crisis and Disarmament at a Turning Point?
Today indicators for disarmament and conversion signal stagnation
or even a reversal for the first time in over a decade. It seems
that disarmament is at a turning point: arms control negotiations
are in a crisis; efforts at conflict prevention and conflict resolution
are a mixed bag of successes and failures; and conversion has slowed
down. Despite this there is still much conversion work ahead, especially
in reintegrating demobilized armed forces personnel and redundant
defense industry workers in Eastern Europe as well as in military
base redevelopment.
This introduction will look at the reasons for the crisis in arms
control negotiations, will summarize the findings of disarmament
and conversion trends, will draw attention to ongoing wars and conflict
resolution efforts as well as to the prevailing trend of opting
for a military solution to conflicts, and will, finally, draw conclusions,
identifying possible future ways of revitalizing the disarmament
and conversion process.
Crisis in arms control negotiations
A number of failed or stagnating negotiations on weapons of mass
destruction symbolize the depth of the crisis in international arms
control. But paradoxically, up to now, the crisis of institutionalized
(negotiated) arms control has not led to the complete end of disarmament.
Arms control of the classical type between opposing blocs of military
alliances has been in crisis since the mid-nineties. However, in
contrast to negotiated arms control, disarmament can be carried
out either on the basis of an arms control agreement, or unilaterally.
Disarmament reduces military forces numerically (weapons, military
personnel, etc.) and/or military power and renders conversion necessary:
as long as financial, human and material resources are being freed
from the military sector, there is also a need to convert them in
order to avoid unnecessary social or economic effects or adverse
political reactions.
Despite the highly visible gridlock in arms control negotiations,
governments have reduced their military forces substantially: weapon
systems have been decommissioned, troops demobilized, arms production
capacities reduced, military bases redeveloped for non-military
purposes, and military expenditures cut. The numerical reduction
of military forces has actually been happening until recently and
is continuing in a number of countries and in certain sectors, but
the year 2000 may prove to be a turning point in numerical, quantitative
disarmament.
How serious is the decoupling of actual disarmament from institutionalized
arms control? Will governments continue to disarm unilaterally and
convert military resources to non-military use as they did in the
second half of the nineties or will this decoupling process put
an end to disarmament and conversion? What can arms control do to
curb the currently prevailing intra-state armed conflicts and how
effectively can it do this? What priorities are necessary to make
arms control a facilitator of future disarmament and conversion?
Despite the crisis in arms control there have recently been successful
arms control agreements. Arguably, the most important one
was the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995
and the NPT Review Conference in April/May 2000. Unfortunately,
this success story is called into question by the actual behavior
of the nuclear weapon states, who have not come to terms on a comprehensive
test ban or a fissile material ban, let alone complete nuclear disarmament—a
requirement of the NPT. Another accomplishment was the Ottawa Convention
banning anti-personnel mines, which took place outside the classical
forums of arms control. Similar efforts stimulated by the landmine
convention are now being undertaken to control the proliferation
and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons.
Two aspects underlying the crisis of traditional
arms control require particular attention: the increasing military
dominance of the United States; and changed perceptions of military
threats.
Hegemonic superpower
Many post-Cold War arms control agreements
were made possible because the Soviet Union, and later Russia, were
in a weak position. The possible revitalization of Russia was seen
in the United States and NATO as a realistic option. Reductions
in military postures both in NATO and in Russia were therefore perceived
as mutually beneficial. But with the continuing disintegration of
the Russian military and the obvious loss of Russia’s status as
a military superpower, the US interest in strategic stability through
bilateral arms control diminished; the bilateral superpower relations
shifted to a clear and growing US dominance. Increasingly, with
the Soviet threat gone, the United States believes it can control
smaller states militarily, even if these states aim at nuclear capabilities
or other types of weapons of mass destruction. The US concept is
increasingly focusing on limiting the weapon systems of other countries
without limiting its own room for action as the only global military
power. This is most clearly illustrated by its plans for a National
Missile Defense system.
This policy has long-term consequences. The
limits of classical arms control demonstrate the logic of the well-known
security dilemma. Wherever a hegemony exists or armaments are asymmetrically
distributed, arms control is likely to come to a stand-still. The
‘haves’ do not see an incentive to give up their superior position,
and stimulate arms acquisition among the ‘have-nots’ just by defending
their superiority. Nevertheless, unilateral disarmament or regional
confidence-building can create trust and may instill a sense of
assurance, spilling over into further rounds of arms control (‘disarmament
spill-over’). It is still too early to judge whether the disarmament
of the nineties will prove to be self-sustaining or will be reversed,
as some indicators tend to suggest.
New military threats: new
forms of arms control
Many countries have started to reassess military
threats and, consequently, the structure of their armed forces.
The number of long-range military interventions has increased. Multilateral
UN peace-keeping missions have moved to center stage in the discussion
of new and future military missions. Regional and internal wars
have become the focus of attention. This has not only entailed preparation
for such missions, but also required that the weapons primarily
used in such wars— landmines, small arms and light weapons —be placed
on the international arms control agenda.
Classical arms control, as it developed during
the Cold War, has proved inadequate for the new situation. Clearly,
the central problem in wars of today is not the lack of international
stability but the destructiveness of the weapons and their enormous
cost. The most prominent example of the emerging reorientation of
arms control are the negotiations of the landmine convention: the
practice of holding on to certain types or numbers of weapon systems
by such countries as the United States, Russia, China and
India is typical of classical arms control, but to the majority
of countries who became party to the convention, this was unacceptable.
‘Like-minded states’ successfully negotiated the landmine treaty
in a new forum, labeled the ‘Ottawa process’. Civil society organizations—NGOs—
became a new actor in arms control. The new combination of ‘like-minded’
governments and a diversified network of nationally or internationally
operating NGOs who made this treaty possible is the only guarantee
for compliance.
There is no reason to be overenthusiastic. Many states—mine producers
as well as mine users, from the United States to Yugoslavia, from
Russia to Pakistan, from China to Burma—are not party to the convention.
Even states who are party to the convention have continued
to plant anti-personnel mines. Non-compliance is not punished. Certain
types of mines which are dangerous to people are not prohibited.
Moreover, additional research and development has been stimulated
by the landmine treaty in order to circumvent its provisions. Whether
similar treaties are attainable, for example in the area of small
arms and light weapons, will be demonstrated by the 2001 UN conference
on the ‘Illegal Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its
Aspects’. At the beginning of the new millennium, small arms control
has enormous scope for improvement. Yet the credibility of both
exporting as well as importing countries could be improved if the
present political declarations are underpinned by stricter regulations
concerning the movements of small arms.
BICC findings: disarmament at a turning point?
Disarmament is easier than arms control. Each government can unilaterally
decide to disarm and need not wait for arms control agreements.
This is exactly what many states did during the second half of the
eighties and particularly during the nineties and is confirmed by
BICC’s measure of disarmament and the potential for conversion,
the BICC Conversion, Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization
(BIC3D) Index. This gives a value of 30 for the world in 1999, indicating
that military sectors had shrunk by 30 percent worldwide between
the transition phase around the end of the Cold War and 1999.
Despite this historically unique reduction in arms, military forces
are still enormous. Global military expenditures are estimated to
have amounted to US $686 billion in 1999 (in prices of 1993); the
present stock of major conventional weapons is still over 422,000
pieces; 21.7 million military troops still serve in the world’s
armed forces; and almost 8 million employees work in the arms industry.
Thus, almost 30 million people still earn their living directly
and fully in the military sector.
Furthermore, high-risk strategies in the field of weapons of mass
destruction are still applied.
Military expenditures—Growing again:
After several years of decline, global military expenditures
were on the rise again in 1999. This new development reverses a
trend that has seen a drastic reduction in military expenditures
and clearly signals a halt, or even a reversal, of disarmament and
conversion. Although the majority of countries are still continuing
to reduce their military expenditures, some of the bigger spenders
such as the United States, France, Germany, China, Russia, Brazil
and Australia increased or announced the growth of their expenditures
in 1999/2000.
Military research and development— Anti-cyclical
trends: Global expenditures on military research and
development were not as strongly affected by the sharp decreases
in the early nineties as other parts of the budget. While military
R&D expenditures in Russia were reduced dramatically, those
in Western market economies only shrank slightly. During the period
of reduced defense production in the nineties, the development of
new weapon technologies and weapon systems was prioritized to preserve
technological capabilities. R&D seems to have done the job of
bridging a period of reduced procurement. With the reversal in military
expenditures described above, R&D efforts are slowing down.
This could, in turn, mean new demand for conversion at military
labs.
Industry restructuring and conversion— Continued
internationalization at a higher level of production: After
the rapid worldwide decrease in military production, there is now
indication that the decrease has not only slowed down and stopped
in recent years but might have already been reversed. At least in
some of the major arms-producing countries, such as the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, Russia and Japan, production has increased
again. Unlike production, however, employment in the arms industry
has continued to decrease. After a number of mega-mergers in previous
years, particularly among the large arms companies in the United
States, attention has now turned to international cooperation agreements
and acquisitions. However, in the military sector, this process
of globalization is much less advanced than in many other industrial
sectors. While conversion and diversification of defense production
continues in smaller companies without much public attention, larger
companies tend to concentrate on their core defense business activities.
Demobilization and reintegration— The need for
cooperation with other programs: The number of soldiers
world-wide has continued to decline for the tenth year running,
although the process has also slowed down. From the peak of 28.8
million in 1987, it was down to 21.7 million in 1999. While some
countries (Russia, Germany) have plans for further cuts in their
armed forces, demobilization programs are still ongoing in others,
particularly as a result of post-war rationalization (as in Cambodia,
East Timor and Sierra Leone). Similar programs will be required
if peace agreements are reached in other countries. Most post-war
demobilization programs are conducted simultaneously with, or as
an integral part of, a more general reform of the security sector
which includes the democratic control of the armed forces. In recent
years, actors in development cooperation have recognized the fact
that they can no longer exclude security issues, but must address
them as part of a strategy for sustainable development.
Base closure and redevelopment— Long-term redevelopment
tasks still ahead: The restructuring processes of
armed forces worldwide have greatly reduced the number of military
bases. This has been heavily concentrated on Europe as well as on
a limited number of countries elsewhere (Australia, Panama, the
Philippines, South Africa, the United States and Vietnam). A large
array of bases freed by the military still need to be redeveloped,
and new civil economic usage needs to be identified. Furthermore,
it can be expected that additional rounds of force restructuring,
rationalization or demilitarization processes will create new tasks
for base redevelopment (for example in Germany, Northern Ireland,
Russia, South Africa and the United States).
Surplus weapons—Political declarations have
to be followed by action now: The slowing pace of
nuclear disarmament has increased the risk of proliferation of all
weapons of mass destruction. While the global market for new conventional
arms shrank after the political changes of 1989/90, the arms industry
has been sustained by an expanded market for the upgrading of used
weapons. From 1990 onwards, the total number of armored vehicles,
warships, missiles and military aircraft held by all states in the
world fell continuously. By 1999, it was almost 30 percent lower.
New initiatives to lessen the impact of contemporary wars, such
as the campaigns against landmines and small arms, have had some
success in their own terms. The issue has become high on the international
policy agenda. Partly in response to the growing pressure from civil
society, governments are increasingly addressing the threats to
human security posed by small arms, but, in practice, political
declarations have not yet been fully implemented.
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