THE REPUBLIC
Policies for Political,
Electoral & Constitutional Reform
Issued 5th April,
2000, Adopted by the National Council, January 2000
[*Note: The first section of Part B, Clause 2b,C is still in Official Draft mode, and is subject to further discussion at the June 2000 Conference]
a/ The PLP proceeds from the premise that major political, electoral and constitutional reforms are long overdue in Australia and that they are not and will not be tackled by the major parties. In developing a blueprint for change we prioritise an order in the change process on the basis of urgency and achievability. Therefore, what follows is an ambit package, eg. proportional representation for all Parliaments is high on the list, followed by the abolition of state upper houses, followed by the creation of a two-tier structure of elected government. Depending on the changing preferences of the Australian people some stages may be speeded up, collapsed or skipped altogether. What we present here is an overall concept for change.
b/ Our principal policies for a new Republic are:
d/ The PLP has adopted the position that a sovereign people naturally have the unfettered right to rewrite and replace their constitution if they believe this to be a requirement for their survival, prosperity and improvement of their democracy. The PLP holds that what has happened in Australia in recent years is like putting the cart before the horse.
Neither major party has a program for significant constitutional and political change.
e/ The notion that a government can be enterprising - and enabling - itself is the antithesis of the view that only private enterprise can deliver economic recovery, jobs and future prosperity for Australia. Many other countries, even those with a significant private sector, have entirely government-owned or jointly-owned public corporations to run key industries, e.g. France and Norway. As the PLP is of the view that Australia should aim at government enterprise rather than privatisation it becomes imperative to build real quality and independence into the Government and Parliaments and to ensure that Government and Parliaments cease to be the servants of powerful multinational corporations and financiers in the private sector.
The reformist strategy is dealt with in three sections:
SECTION 1: THE INADEQUACIES OF THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM;
SECTION 2: A MAXIMALIST MODEL FOR POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN AUSTRALIA;
SECTION 3: DRAFTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION, - CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY, - LAUNCHING THE NEW CONSTITUTION BY MEANS OF SECTION 128.
a/ The kind of question which Australians are now increasingly increasingly asking themselves in relation to the Republic is: What kind of a Republic do we really want? If Australians can reconstruct their political system to meet the demands of a society vastly different from Federation in 1900, having greatly advanced technology at its disposal and possessing superior transport and communication systems as well as physical resources, how will they do it? Would there still be any need for a federal system at all? Or would it be a huge hindrance to effective government? Would there still be need a for some 830 politicians? Should they introduce a two-tiered system of elected Government and enable the majority party or coalition to select the Ministry from outside Parliament rather than appoint career politicians? Surely the issue is no longer whether Australia should be a Republic OR continue to be an outpost of a rather shaky constitutional monarchy which has little interest in her distant Dominion. Improving the processes of Government in Australia, steeped in 200 years British colonial and Westminster traditions, is a task habitually avoided by both major parties. Unless it's done Australia may no longer in business on account of its antiquated constitution and political system. More likely it will be governed by the Boards of Directors of foreign Multi National Enterprises through a comprador class of well-paid compliant Australian managers and politicians. That trend is unmistakable already. The PLP intends to create a real democracy in Australia.
b/ The domination by two major parties has led to an erosion of democracy and to a weakening of Government, often described as "the passing of Parliament". The electoral system has kept that now sterile, male dominated, two-party system in place for far too long. A greater variety of interests, persons and cultures should be represented in the National Parliament. The role of the citizens in constitutional change has been minimal and tokenistic. The initiative and timing of referendums is the prerogative of the Government of the day. Almost every constitutional referendum turns into a political slanging match regardless of the merits of the proposal(s). Only eight of many such referendums have been successful over the 100 years of federation. The rejection of the four proposals of the 1988 referendum demonstrated the present Constitution's dangerous inflexibility once again. Updating the Constitution has proven to be far too difficult. The result has been to devise expensive ways to circumvent it, often unsuccessfully, a recipe for stagnation and deterioration.
c/ The PLP's answer to these problems is that the piecemeal tinkering must end. Australians need to rewrite the entire constitution. The idea that the constitution cannot be replaced by another one, supposedly because it can only be amended (and then only in terms of the highly unsatisfactory amending clause, section 128), is no more than a legal fiction. It suggests that the legal system ultimately rules Australia rather than the people. This line of argument, frequently voiced by so-called constitutional experts, suggests that today's Australians are shackled by past agreements among some of the citizens who voted on the 1900 Constitution Draft in a VOLUNTARY referendum 100 YEARS AGO.
2a/ The phoney Minimalist Republic 'debate' resulted in the Constitutional Convention of February, 1998. The Convention was dominated by conservative politicians, Minimalist candidates of the ARM and the pro-monarchist candidates. However, a vocal minority of Maximalist candidates presented the kind of arguments which are embodied in PLP policy as well. In addition, the Australian voters favour a directly elected President a fact that the conservative majority at the Convention found hard to deal with. We have incorporated that wish also in our policy.
2b/ That policy now follows:
Head of State to have essentially symbolic powers, plus some reserve powers aimed essentially at breaking legislative deadlocks. In the event of legislative deadlock the President convenes a joint sitting of Parliament where a majority can resolve the matter, or otherwise a referendum is called.
The PLP does not favour the US-style Presidential system or a dual executive structure (as for instance in France).
This official is the leader of the party or coalition of parties which command majority support on the floor of the House of Representatives
We propose a democratisation and broadening of cabinet government in Australia, including consideration of :
We endorse the creation of codes of conduct for each Ministerial Department in order to enshrine a character of ethics and accountability to the decision making processes and to ensure that the Universal Human Rights of the UN Charter and a concern for the welfare of all people becomes the fundamental basis for all policy making.
The PLP calls for a referendum to introduce Proportional Representation by means of the Hare-Clark system based on multi-member electoral districts (these districts could be same as the administrative regions for local governments.)
This would provide scope for the representation of more parties and Independents - provided they would have minum support of, say, 4% or 5% in a nine-member district. This would also end the single-member (district) system, pork barrelling, by-elections, neglected seats (safe seats), electoral boundary changes and the adversarial mode of debate.
The proportion of votes required for representation in a district would not be able to be raised without a referendum or some other means of democratic consultation. This is to ensure that major parties in a district cannot simply vote together and raise the percentage without community consultation, in order to reduce the representation of smaller rival parties and independents.
A system of 30 electoral districts, each returning nine members, would yield a 270 member legislature (House of Representatives). Add to this three Senators per district (possibly not belonging to any party) and a total of 360 MPs would represent the nation in Canberra. That would be less than half the present total number if the states are abolished. The Hare Clark system is well known in Australia as it is used in Tasmania, the ACT, and for the present Senate elections. It is preferred over other PR systems, such as list PR systems and the NZ MMD system of PR (based on the German system).
The Senate would retain its present powers and functions.
The Senate , already elected by PR - Hare Clarke now (although distorted by "malapportionment" on account of the federal system and state representation) would retain its present powers and functions. However, in the PLP proposal Senators would not represent the abolished states. The principal functions of the Senate would be legislative review and holding Parliamentary inquiries as at present. The PLP would remove the power of blocking Supply .
The PLP favours the Robson Rotation system for PR (used in the ACT, and Tasmania) with the right to discontinue the allocation of preferences beyond the number of vacant positions. the PLP supports Voter-determined Above-the-line or Under-the-line Optional Preference Voting. Compulsory voting will be retained.
with provision for optional early elections only if a Government has lost majority support in the House of Representatives, and after exhausting all options of forming a new government under the existing parliament.
Fixed-term parliaments are supported by many people but the major parties won't take steps to introduce this reform once in power. The advantages are widely accepted though. It provides time to implement policy and predictability. It reduces uncertainty and the frequency of elections.
Change the electoral law or write it into the new constitution.
The present states could be replaced by smaller, administrative regions indirectly elected by groups of local councils and/or on some BioRegional principle. Special separate City Administrations could be established modelled perhaps on the Greater Brisbane Council.
This would reduce direct popular elections to two levels: the national and local levels.
The regions could be grafted onto the local government tier. Already an extensive system of voluntary regional councils exists which could be a base to start from. The savings of such measures have been estimated to be in the order of many billions of dollars (possibly $30 billion p.a., Drummond in Hall, 1998) depending on what model of regional administration is adopted. E.g. Drummond has developed detailed scenarios of such options by means of cost/benefit analyses based on applications of linear regression techniques to State, Territory and Local Government outlay as well as population data.
The need for special regions to ensure representation for sparsely populated outlying areas is acknowledged and will be accommodated.
Existing powers and responsibilities of the states would be redistributed between national and regional governing bodies.
The PLP greatly favours the strengthening of local government, both in terms of funding and functions. In order to effectively extend functions critical mass needs to be achieved and some smaller local government units would need to be amalgamated. Certain functions which are now the domain of state governments will be transferred to local government of sufficient size and capacity to handle them. In addition, the PLP will introduce the precinct (or ward) system to ensure maximum community involvement in local government - and generally promote grassroots democracy in every way possible.
In 1900 an excellent case could be made for a federal structure. A lot has changed since then. Communications and transport systems have improved dramatically. In 2000 a country of only 19 million people does not need a federal structure, seven different administrations plus that of the Northern Territory and ACT. All the reasons for federation have long disappeared!
As a first step the PLP advocates the abolition of the state upper houses by means of state referendums - assuming that our priority No. 1, the introduction of PR for state lower houses, has first been achieved. This would then be followed by a campaign to abolish the states altogether.
The protection of human rights and special minorities will also be included in a Bill of Rights.
together with ways of redress and compensation where a communityıs or industry's livelihood is adversely affected.
The new Constitution can be amended in two ways:
ONE: by a 3/4 majority of all National Parliamentarians of both Houses of Parliament voting jointly
OR by a binding, mandatory national referendum which can be introduced in two ways:
The new Constitution needs to be extensively reviewed after every five years. The review need to be given wide publicity and adjustment facilitated.
The PLP recommends a panel of 50 persons representing various key constituencies of all age groups and all classes in society. These should be in a position to consult extensively with their constituencies . Politicians should number no more than five and constitutional experts would be equally limited to five. There could be five foreign constitutional experts to provide input.
It is desirable that the Constitution has a link with the old one and provides continuity in spite of introducing radical changes. Many new Constitutions of national states have been the outcome of great political and/or social upheavals, major crises such as wars, a struggle for independence, civil unrest and secession. However, this does not mean that states which are not subject to such major crises (a) therefore have no need for major changes to the ground rules of their governmental system; (b) that such changes as are needed cannot be achieved in a civil, democratic and peaceful manner. After all major crises are almost always the result of inadequate, evolutionary adjustment.
Moreover, the notion that Australia is free from crisis at present would be challenged by many and denied only by the ultra conservative and foolhardy. It has become a very unequal country in recent decades with many pressing social issues. In economic terms Australia is struggling to maintain its independence and achieve greater competitiveness. International capital is increasingly dictating her destiny. Australia's present Constitution and political system has severe constraints which, the PLP maintains, cannot be remedied by ineffectual piecemeal tinkering at the margins.
The principal problem in having a constitutional referendum accepted has been the requirement laid down in Section 128 that , apart from a national majority, there has to be "majority in a majority of states". Clearly this represents a bias in favour of the federal system itself. In order to alleviate this problem, an undemocratic feature of the present Constitution the cause of much rigidity and expense, the following strategy is recommended:
In a "New Constitution Referendum" there could be two questions in order to overcome the "majority of states" problem, as follows: